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In the Supreme Court
of the '\State of Utah
LEON STUCKI,
P_aintiff and Respondent,
vs.
JAMES ELLIS, W. H. STEWART, JUNES. SPACKMAN,
CLARE SPACKMAN, TH 0'MAS A. TARBET, and 1\1AGNUS OLSEN,
Defendants, and Appellant
THOMAS A. TARBET.

Respondent's

1

Brief

STATEMENT OF FACTS.
The statement of facts in appeUant's brief is incomplete and misleading as to a correct picture of ~11
of the facts, hence we make the following statement
of the facts in this case, as alleged and/ or admitted
in the pleadjngs, or by the parties in their testimony,
or as found by the Court.
June S~ Spackman, daughter of defendant W. H.
Stewart, was the record owner of the premises in
question from October 9, 1945 to March 1, 1946. On
October 16, 1945, she entered into a written agreement
to se"'l said premises to one James Ellis for $1,000, of
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which $400 was paid by Ellis as a down payment; the
balance, $600, was payable at tne rate o.t ~lu pe1.·
month. That contract IS an exhibit in evidence. W.
H. Stewart adm1tted that he acted as agent for his
daughter, June, both in buying and selling said premises. (Tr. 42, 4.8, 59, 61) James Ellis with his wife
and children immediately moved into possession of
said premises. Shortly thereafter the dwelling was
partia ly destroyed by fire. The title to the premises
was never in Ellis's nam.e, but remained in June S.
Spackman until she deeded the premises to appellant
Tarbet March 1, 1946.
Concerning the allegations in tr~e complaint that
plaintiff was induced to do the repair work by the representations of defendant Stewart that the premises
were insured and that he would see that plaintiff got
his money as scon as the repair work was done, the
Court found in its finding No. 3, as follows:
The Court finds that after said premises had
thus been partially destroyed by fire, the p,aintiff
was induced to repair the same by said James
Ellis and W. H. Stewart, under promise and agreement by them to pay the repair bill in full as soon
as the work was completed. IThat said W. H.
Stewart represented to plaintiff and his agent
that said premises was covered by fire insurance,
and that he would see that plaintiff's money was
ready as soon as the repair work was completed.
(This part of the finding is supported by the testimony of Roy Earl. Tr. 24, 27, 29, 31) But in this
connection, the C!ourt further finds that the motion for dismissal and non-suit against said W. H.
Stewart was granted by the Court at the c,ose
of the plaintiff's case for the reason that under
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the Statute of Frauds, the defendant Ste~wart
would not be liable on an oral agreement to answer
for the debt or default of the defendant James.
Ellis.
Plaintiff's testimony is not disputed that plaintiff
repaired said premises dring the period from January
2nd to January 23, 19-16 nor that the cost of repair
was $323.87. \\rhen the repair bill was presented to
Stewart and paym.ent refused, plaintiff, on lVIarch 15,
1946, filed his notice of mechanic's lien against said
pr~mises, as provided by statute.
This is a suit to
forec.ose said mechanic's lien.
In paragraph No. 6 of the Findings the. Court
found.
The Court further finds that defendant
Thomas ...-!\.. Tarbet purchased the said pre111ises
about the first day of lVIarch, 1946, at which time
a deed was made by June S. Spackman and· husband, Clare Spackman, to d~efendant Tarbet. · That
defendant James Ellis did not have title or ownership in said premises in his name but merely had
a contract for the purchase thereof at the time
he sold his interest in the premises, about February 25, 1946.
James Ellis sold his interest in said premises to
defendant Thomas A. Tarbet through W. H. Stewart.
The full purchase price to Tarbet was $1500. The
facts regarding the said sale, the division of the money,
were testified to by Stewart, and are stated in paragraph No. 3 of the Amended Ans\ver of W. H. Stew'art
as follows:
That in pursuance to said listing af~oresaid, the
property \vas sold to the defendant Thomas A.
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Tarbet for a consideration of $1500.00. That at
the time of said sale the . said James Ellis was
indebted to the defendants June S. Spackman and
Cl~re Spackman, in the sum of $610.00, principal
and interest. That the balance of the proceeds
of said sale to the defendant Thomas A. Tarbet,
amounting to $890.00, was disposed of as follows;
to the defendant James Ellis the sum of $800.00,
and to Stewart & Harrison, the sum of $90.00,
to pay commission of $75.00 for making said sale;
and $15.00 to pay general taxes on the_ property
for the year 1945, in the sum of $11.80, and $3.20
for extention of the abstract of tit~e.
Regarding the question \vhether Thomas A. Tarbet was the "head of a family" the Court found in
paragraph No. 7 as· fo~lows:
The Court furthe,r finds that defendant
Thomas A. Tarbet was single and lived with his
mother as a mer.v1ber of her family and in her
home about March 23, 19L16, when he got married.
That shortly thereafter, said Thomas· A. Tarbet
and wife moved into said premises. That while
said defendant was in the Armed Services he got
an allotment of about $50.00 per month f.or his
mother. That defendant's mother was on relief
prior to receiving said allotment that she was
taken off relief while said allotment continued and
was again restored back on relief after said a.lotment discontinued.
The facts supporting this finding were largely
admitted by Tarbet and were testified to by his mother, l\1ary A. Tarbet~ (Tr.~, 85-9.0).
ARGU.MENT
Respondent submits that the trial court made no
error in its finding of fact number seven, nor in its
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second conclusion of law, that Tarbet is not entitled
to ass~rt any hom\3stead exemption adverse to plaintiff's forecl·osure of his mechanic's lien herein.
Tarbet and his n1other both admitted that Tarbet
lived with his mother in her home and as a men1ber
of her family. She did not live with her son as a
member of his family. (Tr. 85-87) Hence Tarbet cannot qualify as the ''head of his mother's family" , as
specified and defined by statute,-Sec. 38-0-5.
The fact that he had an allotment of $50.00 per
month sent home to his mother while he was in the
Armed Services, (of which it. will not be denied the
Government supplied $28 per month) would not, standing alone, make him the head of his mother's family.
His mother testified that she drew relief from the
Welfare for a long time prior to receiving the allotment checks; that when the a lotment checl\:.S started
they (the \tVelfare) stopped her relief checks, and that
after the allotment checks stopped, "they started me
on relief again." (Tr. 88) This was admitted by appellant. (Tr. 90) Hence Tarbet cannot quality .as the
head of a family and the sole provider for his mother
-Bunker v. Coons, 21 Utah 164,-and the Court made
no error in its finding and conclusion in that respect.
Tarbet admits that he did not get married until
March 23, 1946, (Tr. 94) and that he and his wife
even lived with his mother for a while after that,
bef8re he moved into possession of the property in
question. (Tr. 95) Ar of these facts clearly show.
(1) That Tarbet was not the head of his mother's

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6
family and (2) that he could make no homestead claim
in h1s own right until after March 23, l9i!6. B~for~
that date plaintiff's lien had long since attached to the
property.
After the work had been completed, (January 22,
19,16) appellant could not defeat plaintiff's lien by
entering marriage relatiiOnship. Evans v. Jensen, 51
'

Utah 1, 168 P. 762.
In case at bar, Tarbet did not own or have any
interest in the property when the repair work was
done and when the _ien attached. By statute, Sec. 521-5, plaintiff's lien related back to January 2, 19-16,
when the work was begun. ·
A homestead right may be asserted only by thos~
entitled to the right, and only those may claim the
homestead exemption who are mentioned in the hemestead laws. No one may assert a homestead clailn
under the doctrine of subrogation. 40 C.J.S. 691.
Appellant's counsel asks: "Even though Ellis and
the Spackmans did- not take any affirmative action to
impress the character of a homestead on the property,
may Tarbet now do so?' Our answer is, ''No". The.
statute, Sec. 52-1-3 grants an absolute mechanic's lien,
without any exceptions, for labor done and materials
furnished. 'The homestead statute, Sec. 38-0·-1, provides that the homestead shaii be exempt frd·rri· judgment liens and .execution·· or · f8rced sal "S, but the
statute does not say the 'homestead shall be -exempt
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from a mechanics lien. But this Court has held that
the homestead cla1n1 is exempt from n1echanic' s lien
if the homestead claim is properly set up and asserted,
·vol\.er Lun1ber Co. v. Vance, 88 P. 896.
Hence it is submitted that if Jam,es Ellis had any
homestead right in that property (which we do not
concede he had at time of suit) he would have to assert
and set up such homestead right,-take affirmative
action to impress the character of a homestead on that
prop2rty-in order to defeat plaintiff's foreclosure proceedings. If Ellis had not sold out his interest and
was still in possession of the property, the plaintiff
could still foreclose his mechanic's :ien if Ellis did not
set up and assert his homestead exeimption. Ellis could
waive that right. In other words the statute does not
set up the homestead exemption against a m2chanic's
lien like it does the homestead exemption against j udgment liens. Hence the mechanic's lien when properly
filed is a lien on the homestead property and can only
be defeated by affirmatively setting up the homestead
claim; whereas the judgment lien is no lien at all
upon the homestead. The statute which appsllant
relies on merely says th3;t the homestead premises
may be sold by the homestead claimant, the o'vner,
free and clear of any judgment lien.
But counsel says: "The matter is set at rest by
our statute, Sec. 38-0-2,-'~Th.en . a homestead is c-onveyed bv the ovlner thereof,' etc." Our answer is,
that even if Ell~s had bc€n the ''owner" of the premises
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at the time he sold out his interest, February 25, 1946~
which he was not, tne conclusion reacned by counsel
doesn't follow. Query, whether Ellis cou1d qua11fy as
owner? We think it is appellant's fa1lure to observe
the distinction between mechanic's lien and judgment
lien, as affecting the hom.estead, that has gotten him
into his present difficulty.
The statute, which he quotes, Sec. 38-0-2, says:
"\Vhen a homestead is conveyed by the owner thereof
such conveyance shall not subject the premises to any
li~n or encumbrance to which it wou d not be subject
in the hands of the owner." This is in harmony with
Sec. 38-0-1, which says that the homestead is "not
subject to a judgment lien or forced sale," hence a
sale of the homestead property does not subject it to
any such lien or forced sale. The homestead premises
are, however, subject to the mechanies lien, in the
hands of the owner, for Sec. 52-1-3 grants a mechanic's
lien without execeptioiL l-Ienee Sec. 38-0-2 does not
affect such continuing mechanic's lien,-does not free
the property from such lien.
The hom~stead is often spoken of as a shield for
the protection of the family from creditors of the
homestead claimant. Now counsel seems to claim the·
right to stretch and expand this shie,~d, not for the
protection of the homestead clainia.nt's family, but as
a shield over the property itself in the hands of the
new grantee and for the pr~tection of tl, e new purchaser. This, counsel asserts, is the effect of S3c. 38r

,
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0-~,

even though the new purchaser is not entitled to
claim a homestead in the pren1ises in his own right;
eve·n thoug-h he is not the head of a. fan1ily.
There are t\YO or three additional reasons why
Tarbet cannot claim or set up any hcm,3stead exemption to defeat plaintiff's present foreclosure proceeding-: He fai s to specify "'hether he clailns the homestead ex"mption of Ellis, or of the Spackmans. We think
appellant should specify as to whose homestead he
relies en as his defePse. In addition to the fact that
as a matter of law Tarbet has no right to claim. set
up, or ::>~s('rt, the homestead right or exemption of
P~ther Ell~s or the, Spackmans, we submit that appellant shon1 d at least specify on which one he relies.
wl'"'en he asserts such right. If his answer is that he·
reli"s on both, then he is in the position of asserting
that both parties had homestead rights and exemptions
in the s:"me prop~rty a"'1d at the same tim~,-that June
Sr;.ackman had a homestead right in that property
after sh~ executed a contract of sa·e of said premises
to James Ellis, and let Ellis and his family into possession of the premises. After that contract of sale
was signed (October 16, 1945) the Spackmans we submit, had no longer any rig:1t of possession in said
premises and would have no right to claim any homestead tLerein. The record is silent as to where the
Spack.mans resided or that they signed their nam 3S
to the contract of sale to Ellis ('October 16, 1945) and
the deed to conveyance to· Tarbet (March 1, 1946),
both of which deals and papers their father, W. H.
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Stewart, made and prepared for them. Hence we do
not see how June Spackman cou d claim a ho1nestead.
in that property. Nor did the Spackmans ever assert
any homestead rights in that property until they
filed their Answer, in case at bar, which was long after
they had conveyed the premises to Tarbet by their
warranty deed.
James Ellis had S<)ld out his contractual interest
1n said premises, and no longer had any interest thereIn. We have noted that when Ellis sold his interest
(February 25, 1946) he got $800 in cash for his equity
in his contract of purchase. Hence Ellis had abandoned his contract of purchas·~. He had lost al his
right to purchase said premises, as well as any right
of possession therein. By selling out his equitable interest in said premises he fnrfeited and abandoned 1: :s
contract and any homestead rights he might have
had under that contract of purchase. In the case of
Swanson v. A.nderson, 38 P. (2d) 1065, the Oregon
court said:
The right of homestead however does not exist
after the right of possession is lost, and the right
of possession ceases when the contract is lawfully
terminated.
40 C.J.S. pg 522, reads as follows:
Forfeiture or abandonment of contract. The hom.estead right is lost with the loss of the rights of
the purchaser under his contract· for the purcliaser
of :and.
To the same effect is Montgomery v. Wise, 62:0:P. · (2d)
647, (Okla.) CL:arly after Ellis sold out, he could
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not thereafter cl:1im any hom('stead right in the premises: so how can appellant no\v claim the right to set
up Ellis' homestead rights?
Counsel again asserts that the statute, Sec. 380-2, ''is simple and can mean on y one thing, i.e. if the
homestead exemption could have been asserted by
Ellis or the Spackmans then the conveyance to Tarbet
would not subject the property to the lien of plaintiff." Again we repeat that counsel jumps to a l~ong
unwarranted conclusion and assumes much in ,making
such a statement, which is, of course, not justified
under the facts and the· law: (1) He assumes that
Ellis or the Spackmans could have asserted a homestead exemption in said prem ~ses, in this ac;tion, which
we have sho\vn -is not true, and (2) couns·el a'so assumes that if either Ellis or the SpacLmans could
assert a homestead. claim in said premises (he does
not bother to designate which) then Tarbet may now
assert such claim, even though he cannot assert a
homestead claim in his own right. This is a new and
unwarranted conclusion under the statute or law which
he cites. \i\r e have never heard of such a contention
before. "',re doubt whether this Court has. Yet for
support of the major premise of his contention, subrogation of homestead right, couns·el cites no authority.
Certainly the statute (Sec. 38-0-2) w~ich he cites and
relies on does not justify or support such a contention.
vVe have no quan·el with the law quoted by counsel from 40 C.J.s.· pg 612, nor with any of the other

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

12
authorities cited on pages 5 and 6 of appC~lant's brief
to the effect that, "the conveyance does not place the
creditor in any better posit1on than he was before the
transfer." We agree to that. We do not claim that
that plaintiff and respondent is in any better position
now· than he was before the transfer (conveyance) of
the property to Tarbet. But neither is the pla~ntiff
in any worse position. The statute Sec. 38-0-2 does
not .affect the plaintiff's rights one way or the other.
We are willing to concede, for the sake of argument, that if Ellis had not sold out his interest and
equity in the premises and in his contract of purchase,
and if Ellis and his family were still in possession of
and ~iving on the premises and were present in court
defending against plaintiff's present foreclosure proceedings, that then Ellis would have the right, if he
chose to do so, to set up and assert a homestead right
in said premises which would have the effect of rlefeating plaintiff's present foreclosure proceedings. But
that fact does not permit or justify Tarbet's present
contention that he (Tarbet) is now subrogated to,
and may set up the hom.estead right of. Ellis, which
E( lis might have set up if Ellis had not sold out,
abandoned his right to purchase, and moved aw:ay from
the premises.
Appellant, in making such a contention, assumes
both of his premises, on which his conclusion i~ based.
Neither of his premises is true, nor in fact exists.
Thus he assumes, (1) That if Ellis were present in
court he (E:Iis) could set np a homeste~d claim in the
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premises. 'rhat is obviously not true, f\)'l· Ellis has
long since (February 25, 1946) sold out his interest
in the pren1:ses, abandoned his contract and moved
a\vay from the premises. El is' whereabouts is unkno\vn. (2) Next appellant assum2s that he is subrogated to and may set up and claim the homestead
rights \\·hich Ellis might have set up and claimed.
That premise is equally false and untenable.
\Ve think appellant is in much the same state of
\vis~1ful thinking as the ardent fisherman was who,
\vhen asked ho\v many fish he had caught, rep ied:
"\Yhen I catch this ·one nibbling at my hook, and one
more, I'll have two."
CROSS ASSIGNlVIENT OF ER.ROR
The Court erred in granting defendant W. H.
Ste\vart's motion for nonsuit and in its dismissal of
the action as to him.
The Court granted Stewart's motion for nonsuit
and dismissal under Sec. 33-5-4 (2) which provides
that ''every promise to answer fnT the debt, default
or miscarriage of another" shall be void "unless such
agreement, or some note or memorandum thereof, is in
writing subscribed by the party to be charged the1:ewith."
\Ve think the facts herein bring defendant Stewart within the exceptions provided for in Sec. 33-5-6
(2) which provides. ''A promise t~o· an~wer for the
obligation of another in any of the following cases is
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deemed an o1·iginal obligat1on of the promisor and need
llOl~

Oe lll WI'l LlHg':

"(2) Whe1e the creditor parts with value or
enters 1nt:o an oo1Igat1on in cousH.teration ot tne obligation in respect to WH1ch tne prom1se is mc«1e In
terrr1s or , under circurnstances s uc11 as to render the
party making the prom1se the principal cteotor and
the person in wnose behalf it IS made his surecy."
If Stewart wasn't the real owner in selling the·
property to Ellis, he certainly had the same interest
.and anxiety to have the property repaired. He admitted he was looking after it and acting for his daughter June.
Ellis told the p- aintiff that he was buying the
property from Stewart and that Stewart said it was
covered by insurance. But plaintiff was not willing to
rely on Ellis's statement. Before unde·rtaking to do
any of the said repair work, plaintiff sent his foreman,
Roy Earl, with Ellis over- to see W. H. Stewart, so as
to get that point cle:ar as to who was going to be responsible,-where the money was c.oming from,-to pay
.for the repair work.
In substance Roy Earl testified as follows: "Ellis
pleaded to have the work done ; said the place was
insured and that he was buying it from Mr. Stewart.
Ellis int~cduced me to Mr. Stewart, and said. 'Mr.
Stewart, I haven't any money to pay for it. I understand this place has insurance on it.' (Tr. 23) Stew-
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art said, 'The· place is covered by insurance, just as
soon as the work is completed, if you will present
n1e \Yith a bil I'll see that it is paid.' I told Stewart
I understood ~lr. Butler · had started to repair the
prem1ses. Stewart said, 'Mr. Butler has failed to keep
his agreement, and there is no string attached to it,
so \Yhen you complete the work, present the bill and
l'il see that it is paid.' (Tr. 24)
"~""hen

I told Stewart that he had told us the·

house was covered by insurance, he said, 'the house
was covered by insurance, but lVlr. Garff had cancelled
it out.' (Tr. 27)"
Cross Examination by lVIr. Preston:
''Q. So \vhen you did the work you reEed on Mr.
Ste,vart' s statement of insurance?
"A. Absolute·y.
(Tr. 29)
Mr. Stewart said
there \vould be no responsibility on Mr. Ellis' part,
that we were to present the bill to him and he would
see that it "'·as paid. Mr. Stewart was to take care of
the collection of the insurance. He assured us that
the insurance w9uld pay for the repair work. He asked
me what the cost of the repair work would be. I
told him between $300 and $400. Stewart said that's
a hundred dollars cheaper than Mr. Butler agreed to
do it for." (Tr. 31)
The fact that Stew:art. had previou~; y had an
"~greement" with Butler to do that repair work.· (~ho
had failed to keep his agreement) is significant, we
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submit, as showing: ( 1) That Stewart w.a.s the real
party interested in having said premises repaired, and
(2') Ste\vart was the man providing the money for ~he
repair work. Stewart did not deny that part of Earl's
testimony. Stewart was also interested in knowing
the estimated amount of the repair bill, which further
shows that Stewart expected to provide the money.
In its finding No. 3, the Court found:
'The Court finds that after said premises had
thus been partially destroyed by fire, the plaintiff was induced to repair the same by said James
Ellis and W. H. Stewart, under promise and
agreement by them to pay the repair bFl in full
as soon as the work was completed. That said
W. H. Stewart represented to the plaintiff and
his agent that said premises was covered by fire
insurance, and that he would see that plaintiff's
money was· ready as soon as the repair work was
completed.
We think the trial court erred in its ruling dismissing as to Stewart, for under the circumstances
ana laCL;S in case at bar ~tewarc· s rep1·esentation tual!
tue place was utsurred, and. tnat ue would see L-1lat 111e
money was paid as soon as tne repa1r worK was tlone
and tne bul presented, was solely relied on by plaintiff, and made Stewart the pr1ncipal ouligor. .Plalntiff did not re~y on Ellis to pay tne repcur bill. As
we have seen, Elis stated right in fron~ of Stewart,
when he introduced plaintiff's foreman, that he (Ellis)
had no money. Plaintiff parted with value (labor and
materials) in respect to the payment of which Stewart's Tepresentation ·and promise was "maJ.e in tern1s
or under circemstances such as to render ·the party
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making- it (Ste\vart) the prineipal debtor and the per~
son 1n \vnose behalf it is made. (Ellis) his surety."
.~.-\

promise to pay for labor or n1aterials is not
within the statute where the contract is perforn1ed
sole y on the credit of the pron1isor, who has a beneficial interest in the performance of the contract. 37
C.J.S. 540.
Stewart does not claim that his promise was a collateral ob1igation, or that of a sur~ty for ElEs-that
Stewart would pay if Ellis didn-'t. Stewart denies that
Roy Earl ever came and talked to him. The foreman,
Roy Earl, is not contradicted that E; lis stated right
in front of Stewart and Earl that he (Ellis) had no
money. Stewart's state1nent to plaintiff's foreman,
was definite, clear and unequivocal, that the premises
were covered by insurance, and that as soon as the
work was done a::1d the _bill presented, he (Stewart)
would see it was paid. vVhat statement could be ~ore
assuring, or would better allay any fears or better
induce plaintiff and his foreman to pr·nceed and do the
repair work?
The p- aintiff relied upon Stewart's promise. He
did not lock to or expect Ellis to pay for the repair
bill. Plaintiff did not send the bill to Ellis, but he
mailed the bill directly to Stewart. This also shows
that there was no dcubt in plaintiff's mind as to who
shou~d pay; that plaintiff relied solely upon Stewart
ard that he exp~cted Stewart to send him a check or
see that the bill was paid.
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It was an original obligation, of Stewart, which
was not within the Statute. It was not a promise to
pay Ellis' debt. Ellis had no money. Plaintiff was
not anxious to do that repair work, and did so only
on Stewart's assurance that the money would be ready
when the work. was completed.
It is important to note that Stewart apparently
thought that he had the insurance policy, for he testi~
fied: ''At the time of the fire, I didn't have the insurance. When El is came in after the fire, we got busy
to find out why he (C:urtis) hadn't brought the insurance in as he agreed to. We found Orson Garff had
cancelled it. Then immediately I wrote fire insurance
on the property, but that was after the fire." (Tr.
57)
While in the case of .McMillan v. Dick over, 248 P.
154, the Oregon court held defendant's prom-ise was a
collateral prom1se, and thus within the statute, the
Oregon court quotes and states the rules of law appli~
cable in concise and c. ear terms. The O·regon court
uses this language.
. . . ·If the promise is collateral, it is within the
statute of frauds and plaintiff cannot prevail; but
if there is evidence tending to show an original
obligation on the part of defendant, the finding
of the jury in reference thereto is conculsive.
In determining whether a given state of facts
constitutes an original or a collateral promise, the
intention of the parties controls, and this must
be ascertained from the words used in makin 0'
0

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

19
the promise, the situation of the parties, and all
of tne circumstances surrounding the transaction.
l\Jlasters at al. v, Bidler et al., 101 Or. 322, 198
P. 912, 199 P. 920; lVIackey v. Smith et al., 21 Or.
598, 28 P. 974; 25 R.C.L. 489. Where the language
used by· the parties is ambiguous and the intention is not clear, it is a question of fact for the
jury as to whether a promise is origina, or collateral. ~lasters et al. v. Bidler et al., supra;
l\Iackey v. Smith et al., supra. As stated in 25
R.C.L. 490:
"\Vhere the language used, together with the
surrounding facts and circumstances, makes it
doubtful whether the parties intended by the
prom;se to create an original or a co~lateral obligation. the intention should be determined by the
jury."
However, when the facts are undisputed and
but one reasonable inference can be drawn therefrom, it becomes a question of law for the court
to determine. 27 R.C.L. 390 ; Breidenback et al.
v. Upper V:alley Orchards Co., 57 Mont. 247, 187
P. 1008; l\fasters et al. v. Bidler et al., supra.
Justice Brewer, in Davis v. Patrick, 141 U.S.
479, 12 S. Ct. 58, 35 L. Ed. 826, says:

"* * * The real character of a promise does
not depend altogether upon the form of expression, but largely on the situation of the parties;
and the question always is, what the parties
mutua~ly understood by the language, whether
they understood it to be a collateral or a direct
pro1nise."
Courts are concerned with substance rather
than form.
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The primary inquiry is. To whom was credit
extended at the time of the sale: Did plaintiff
rely exclusively upon the credit of defendant, or
did he merely look to him as a guarantor? Shaw,
C.J., in Cahill v. Bigelow, 18 Pock. (Mass.) 369,
quoted with approval in Mackey v. Smith et al.,
supra, thus states the t~st:
'' 'Was the credit given to the person receiving the goods? If it was, then such promisor is
a guarantor on~y, undertaking to pay another's
debt. If no credit w·ere given to the person receiving the goods, then . the promisor is himself
debtor for goods sold to him and delivered to another by his order.' "
In Brown v. V\Teber, 38 N. Y. 187, it is stated:
"The test to be applied to every case is,
whether the party sought to be charged is the
principal debtor, prilnarily liable, or whether he
is only liable in case of the default of a third
person; in ·other words, whether he is the debtor,
or whether his relation to the creditor is that ()f
surety to him for the performance, by some other
person, of the obliation of the latter to the creditor."
We think the trial court acted with haste, and
without due consideration, and was also confused as
t<() the proper rule of law applicable under the statute
of frauds when applied to the facts in the case at bar.
At the close of the case the court said:
THE COURT. As far as the re,:ative material
facts of this case are concerned, I doubt that
thPre is much clispPte. I g-rHnterl the nonsuit
PP''"'~n~t lVTr. StPwart bec~use I felt that it was il1~nfl1 hflnt unon fh e plaintiff to prove ownership in
Mr. Stewart of this property in order to avoid the
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statute of frauds. The most that can be given
to the testimony was that Mr. Stewart had represented that there was insurance on the propert:v and out of that insurance the repair bill
,\·onld be paid when it was pressnted, and I think
that is a fact ; but I don't beli~ve that either
sho"·s o\vnership in Mr. Stewart or any rights
that he had in the property which would take
i~ out of the statute of frauds, which requires
that any· promise to pay for the debts or defau· ts
or miscarriag-e of any person must be in writin~
~nd signPd by the psrson sought to be charged.
(Tr. ·102)

be-

Thus the Court -definite·y states that while be
lieves that Stewart represented that there was insurance on that property and that out of that insurance
he \V·C uld see that the repair .bill would be. paid when
it was presented, yet the c·ourt nevertheless l).eld that
in as much as plaintiff had failed to prove ownership
in 1\Ir. Stewart, or that Stewart had any. rights in
that property, that the case was not taken out of -the
statute of frauds, and Stewart would not be liable and
was entitled to a nonsuit. That, lack of ownership
in Stewart, clear y was an erroneous reas·on on which
to grant- the nonsuit, and we submit the court erred
in its_ ruing that on account of such lack of ownership
or interest in the property in Stewart, his promise
came within the statute.

•
In as much as the Court definitely found that
defendant W. II. Stewart represented that the property was cover0d by fire insurance and that he would
see that plaintiff's m·r'noy was ready as soon as the
rcpa;r ,vork was completed, respondent submits, as a
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matter of law, that he is now entitled to judgment
against W. H. Stewart as the party primarily liable
for plaintiff's repair bill that that the ru; ing of the.
trial court granting a nonsuit as to Stewart should
be reversed., and the trial court should be directed to
enter judgment against W. II. Stewart personally for
the amount of plaintiff's repair bill, costs, etc., as
prayed for in the complaint.
Respondent submits that from the facts in the
record and as found by the trial court, the statute of
frauds is not a defense of which Stewart can avail
himse ·f; for by his representation and promise Stewart made himself primarily liable. The fact that pla :ntiff failed to prove that Stewart was the owner, or the
fact that Stewart had no interest in the property, if
that be a fact, is, we submit, after all, immaterial.
The important question is: Did Stewart by his promise assume primary responsibility for that repair
bill? Which the Court found he did.
Respectfully Submitted,

LEON FONNESBECK
Attorney for Respondent.
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